Lobbying in Europe: Knowledge as the main lobbying resource by Taminiau, Y.T.A. & Wilts, A.S.
VU Research Portal
Lobbying in Europe: Knowledge as the main lobbying resource
Taminiau, Y.T.A.; Wilts, A.S.
published in
Journal of Public Affairs
2006
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1002/pa.215
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Taminiau, Y. T. A., & Wilts, A. S. (2006). Lobbying in Europe: Knowledge as the main lobbying resource. Journal
of Public Affairs, 6(2), 122-130. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.215
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
Journal of Public Affairs
J. Publ. Aff. 6: 122–130 (2006)
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.215
Corporate lobbying in Europe,
managing knowledge and
information strategies
Yvette Taminiau* and Arnold Wilts
Department of Public Administration and Organization, Free University,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
* Given that knowledge and informationare critical resources for acquiring access to the EU
policy process, the question of this paper is how firms should manage the knowledge and
information strategies surrounding their lobbying attempts. Developing an appropriate
resource base is critical for firms trying to bring their interests to bear on European
decision-making. The same holds for the ability to recognize potential points of entry to the
EU policy process. Next to substantial knowledge and expertise, therefore, the ability to
understand policy dynamics and the appropriate timing of lobbying attempts are critically
important in corporate lobbying in Europe. The implication of this argument is that
managing knowledge and information strategies become increasingly important for
handlings firms’ public affairs.
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Introduction
Corporate lobbying for many firms is an
essential aspect of their competitive strategies.
Attempts by firms to influence public decision-
making, however, greatly vary across institu-
tional settings (Hillman andKeim, 1995). In this
paper, we reflect on lobbying strategies in an
European context.We depart from the assump-
tion that the better the fit between the demand
and supply side of the lobbying resources, the
more chance the transaction is successful and
the likelier that firms may influence public
decision-making (Van Schendelen, 2003).
Of central importance, therefore, is the logic
of access, either of private firms or of organized
business interests (Greenwood, 1997; Beyers,
2004).
This paper builds on the argument that
access to the European Union’s decision-
making process is largely determined by
intangible resources, notably knowledge, infor-
mation and expertise (Bouwen, 2002). There-
fore, effective lobbying in Brussels often
requires firms to invest in the establishment
of recurrent interactions with public decision-
makers. These kinds of interactions induce the
emergence of trust between private and public
actors and facilitate the exchange of reliable
knowledge and information among them. From
the perspective of the European institutions
this is important to legitimate EU decision-
making. Given that knowledge and information
are critical resources for acquiring access to the
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EU policy process, therefore, the question is
how firms should manage the knowledge and
information strategies surrounding their lobby-
ing attempts. This question is of interest in this
paper.
In the next section we discuss existing
analytical models for analyzing corporate poli-
tical strategy decisions. In the third section of
the paper the main characteristics of the EU
policy process are discussed. After that, in the
fourth section, the paper argues more specifi-
cally how firms’ knowledge and information
strategies need to be adapted to the complexity
of EU decision-making processes. Based on the
observation that knowledge and information
are the main lobbying resources in the EU, our
conclusions refer to how firms may manage
knowledge and information flows when mana-
ging their public affairs and trying to realize
influence on European decision-making.
Corporate political strategies
Corporate political action literature has identi-
fied a variety of factors that structure the
political behaviour of firms and condition its
contribution to firm performance. The nature
of market strategies (Baron, 1995), organiza-
tional characteristics of firms (Hillman and
Keim, 1995; Schuler and Rehbein, 1997),
structural features of markets and industries
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Grier et al., 1994;
Mahon and McGowan, 1998) and the institu-
tionalmake-up of political systems (Lord, 2003)
all have been shown to influence corporate
political action. Depending on these character-
istics, firms choose among different tactics
and strategies to effectively influence political
decision-making and further their market
strategies.
An often cited model for classifying and
analyzing corporate political strategy decisions
is that of Hillman and Hitt (1999). These
authors suggest that corporate political strate-
gizing entails three decisions made by senior
decision-makers within the firm. First, whether
to relate to government on a long-term
relational basis or in only in one-off interaction,
that is in a transactional mode. Second,
whether to act individually or collectively, that
is by adopting a going-it-alone strategy or by
acting within a larger interest group such as a
business association or trade federation.
Third, what type of strategy to use when
interacting with public authorities and govern-
ment agencies. Regarding this last choice for
particular tactics and strategies, Hillman and
Hitt distinguish an information, financial

























Figure 1. Corporate political strategizing (adapted from Hillman and Hitt, 1999).
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A first strategy is that of providing informa-
tion and expertise to public decision-makers.
This may concern information about policy
positions of leading firms as well as market
information, for instance, about pending
investment or relocation decisions that can
have a major economic impact. Firms’ informa-
tion strategiesmay also include the provision of
expert knowledge of possible solutions to
publicly visible issues such as environmental
problems (Taminiau, 2006). This sort of infor-
mation can greatly influence the cost-benefit
analysis of particular policy choices as they are
being prepared and implemented at different
phases of the policy cycle. Information, knowl-
edge, and expertise, therefore, are a critical
resource for firms when trying to influence
public decision-making (Dahan, 2005).
Second, next to providing information,
corporate actors may try and influence public
decision-making by providing financial support
to political institutions, for example by sup-
porting candidates running for public office.
This is particularly effective in open and
pluralistic political system such as that in the
United States. However, in European countries,
given the often highly organized nature of
business—government interactions, financial
incentive strategies are less common.
A third strategy for firms to influence
public decision-making is through grass roots
approaches, creating support for particular
policy solutions and organizing pressure on
political institutions and government agencies
in favour of those solutions (Lord, 2003). These
bottom-up efforts to influence public decision-
making can be very effective, particularly for
smaller firms (Cook andBarry, 1995). Also, they
are becoming increasingly important in an
European context. The emergence of new
information and communication technologies
increasingly enable grassroots initiatives. Infor-
mation is more readily accessible and more
easily communicated to the EU institutions
(Roper, 2002; Bouwen, 2004).
Most firms, however, particularly larger ones
(Coen and Dannreuther, 2002), will simulta-
neously pursue different strategies at the same
time. A firm may use a combination of political
strategies in an attempt to shape its environ-
ment through public policy influence. These
attempts generally will be more effective when
they are well integrated and mutually adjusted
(Schuler et al., 2002; Baron, 1995). This is
especially the case for diversified firms that
simultaneously operate in different environ-
ments. Particularly in these firms combinations
of generic approaches to corporate political
strategy will emerge in the practice of corpo-
rate lobbying and the handling of public affairs.
This complicated the management of public
affairs but it also allows firms to adjust their
corporate political strategies to different insti-
tutional environments—in this case to the
complicated nature of EU decision-making.
The European Commission encourages pri-
vate interest groups to adopt a relational or
long-term approach (Coen, 1997). This does
not mean that transactional approaches can-
not, or indeed are not, used but these
approaches generally are less rewarding in
terms of realized influence. The same holds
for financial incentive strategies that can be
particularly effective in, for instance, an US-
context but which are not used much in
Brussels. Rather, the European Commission
rewards those firmswho do pursue a long-term
relationship by enabling them to realized
privileged or preferential access to its
decision-making process. This, however,
makes lobbying efforts particularly difficult.
Complexity of the EU policy process
The main characteristics of the European
policy-making arena can be categorized in
terms of structure, process, resources, and
culture (Figure 2). First, the main structural
characteristic of EUdecision-making is itsmulti-
level nature. The EU policy process constantly
reiterates between national and supranational
levels of decision-making. This forces private
actors to be active, often at the same time, at
different levels and in different arenas of public
decision-making. At these different levels, firms
are confronted with a wide variety of stake-
holders and interested parties. Second, the
process of EU decision-making is characterized
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by the fact that lobbyists have to stay along the
issue all the long the policy cycle. Third,
resources, notably knowledge and expertise,
typically provide access to the different Eur-
opean institutions. Accordingly, the culture of
EU decision-making is characterized by inform-
ality and mutuality. These four characteristics
condition the way in which private actors
may bring their interests to bear on public
decision-making and realize influenceonpolicy
outcomes.
European policy-making takes placewithin a
highly complicated and policy network
(Schneider et al., 1994). Decision-making in
the EuropeanUnion requires the establishment
of trans-national alliances. It is also character-
ized by established and recurrent forms of
private–public interactions. Given the multi-
level nature of EU decision-making cooperation
among firms and between them and other
organizations in order to realize influence does
not only occur in Brussels. Firms may adopt a
national route in order to realize influence
instead of going directly to the EU institutions
(Bennett, 1997). National governments in
many ways are behaving as private interest
groups themselves and in many industries
coalitions between the representatives of firms
and those of government agencies are com-
mon. The formal institutional structure at the
EU level thus is coupled with the policy-
network at the national level (Wessels, 1997).
This is a complex and layered process that
encompasses different levels of political
decision-making. Local, regional, national,
intergovernmental and supranational and Eur-
opean forces operate simultaneously.
Firms trying to steer through this complexity
are faced with a number of possibilities when
trying to realize influence on policy outcomes.
They can, for instance,work through collective
interest organizations that represent particular
industries, either at national or European level
(Greenwood, 1997; Knill, 2001). Another
possibility is to try and realize individual access
to European decision-makers. Generally, how-
ever, only large firmswill be able to choose this
approach (Coen and Dannreuther, 2002).
Small- and medium-sized firms, in contrast, are
faced with resource constraint that often
prohibits them to follow this route (Cook and
Barry, 1993; Wilts and Meyer, 2005). A third
possibility is that firms hire private lobbyists to
carry out the lobbying work. These different
possibilities can be followed simultaneously, as
some largefirmsdo, and they are compatible. In
all cases, however, the most important
resource for acquiring access to the EU
decision-making process is providing knowl-
edge, information and expertise (Bouwen,
2002).
One of the reasons the Commission asks the
industry for direct information inputs is that it
suffers from a structural lack of human
resources and lack of expert knowledge
(Peterson, 1991; Héritier et al., 1996; Wessels,
1997). EUdecisions are taken at a large distance
fromday-to-day economic affairs in theMember
States. This problem increases with the expan-
sion of the European Union. The EU institu-
tions, therefore, have a persistent problem
legitimating their regulatory and legislative
efforts. The Commission legitimates much of
its functioning through the wide-spread use of
expertise of interests groups in the policy
making process, thus binding private actors in
its decision-making.
The inclusion of private actors in public
decision-making, however, varies. Private inter-
ests such as large firms or NGOs can be part of

















Figure 2. Main characteristics of EU decision-making.
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2002a). These networks range from close-knit
policy communities with characteristics such
as stable membership, high insular and strong
structural dependencies to more open and
transitory issue networks, characterized by
fluid membership, high permeability and weak
structural dependencies (Peterson, 1991: 273;
March and Rhodes, 1992). The first type of
network resembles an epistemic community, ‘a
network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge’ (Haas 1992, in Zito, 2001,
pp. 585). Recurrent interactions between its
members, embedded in ongoing relations of
mutual influence and dependency are central
to this type of network. The second type of
network represents an issue network, an ad
hoc coalitions or alliance that ‘exist(s) for the
specific purpose of working on a single issue
and dissolve when that issue reaches some
resolution or when the coalition partners no
longer feel the effort is worthwhile’ (Berry,
1986 in Pijnenburg, 1998: 305). These type of
networks may be especially effective in getting
an issue on the political agenda.
Apart from efforts to get an issue on the
policy agenda, actors involved in the policy-
making processmust pay attention to themode
and manner of the articulation of an issue
(Peterson, 1995). Since the definition of a
problem and the phase of the agenda setting
have far-reaching consequences, it is important
to get involved in the policy cycle as soon as
possible. It is during the early phases that
different actors can try and influence not only
the topic, but also the prioritization of parti-
cular issues and problems. This holds, in
particular, for European policy which is
increasingly made in by co-decisions proce-
dures between the different EU institutions
such as the Council, the Commission and the
European Parliament. Policy proposals go back
and forth between these institutions. Getting
involved in an early stage of the policy cycle is
especially important. For example, in the final
directive, after the European Council and the
European Parliament havemade their contribu-
tion, the drafters of the original Commission’s
proposal will find that most of their ideas still
remain (Héritier et al., 1996; Peterson, 1995).
With the rectification of the Treaty of the
Maastricht (effective 1993) and the Treaty of
the Amsterdam (effective 1999) a shift in the
balance of power occurred which resulted in
an increase of influence of the Member States
and an increase in influence of the European
Parliament. This led to more co-decisions
procedures (Pedler, 2002b). In the course of
its decision-making, the Council sets in motion
the mechanisms for consultation with the
member governments. Firms trying to influ-
ence EU decision-making, therefore, are
increasingly faced with the strategic problem
of locating entry points in a multidimensional
policy decision-making process. Given the
structure and organization of this process
locating appropriate entry points may be
particularly difficult, especially in the early
stages of decision-making which matter most
(Bellier, 1997). From the mid-1990s onwards,
increasingly more actors wanted to co-define
the policy issue in concurrence with the
European Commission. This means that more
and more actors are competing for access and
are trying to get involved at the beginning of the
policy cycle. This puts great emphasis on the
way private actors manage their public affairs
strategies.
Tactical and strategic choices
Direct and collective lobbying can turn out to
be mutually reinforcing for large firms operat-
ing in the EU arena. Another strategy for firms
that aim at long-term benefits through partici-
pation in policy networks is not to restrict their
participation to contributions to forums in
which the firms can benefit directly but also
to invest through their participation in commis-
sions which are only indirectly related to their
speciality or industry (Coen, 1997). To be
simultaneously connected in different forums
may benefit the actors in the longer term.
Being able to develop more differentiated
political strategies can also help firms to
recognize important policy changes at a
relatively early stage. A policy cycle can be
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Public Affairs, May 2006
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disturbed by external events and discontinu-
ities that shape the policy networks (Wilks and
Wright, 1987). Such events can be electoral
results or a breach of trust between the actors
in the policy networks or, for instance,
unilateral or coercive government action. Firms
attempting to lobby the EU institutions must
integrate this into their strategic outlook. They
must recognize discontinuities in an early stage
in order to identify and assess potentially useful
entry points. Acquiring access through infor-
mation thus places greater emphasis on the
information processing capabilities of firms.
Next to information, therefore, expertise and
learning capabilities become important for
firms interacting with the EU institutions
and trying to realize influence on public
decision-making.
The real resource that counts in Europe is the
provision to public decision-makers of credible
information and knowledge (Bouwen, 2002).
This is true for individual firms as well as for
their representatives such as EU trade federa-
tions (Beyers, 2004). Policy-making in Europe
has often been described in terms of comitol-
ogy: policy is made in the large number of
commissions where experts meet (Dehousse,
2003). Extensive information networks, for
instance, have emerged between multinational
corporations and the representatives of differ-
ent European decision-making bodies. The
representatives of industry and business gen-
erally are very well informed about what goes
on in the different European institutions. These
actors typically have extensive networks to
exchange information and scrutinize the
work of the Commission and the Council
(Wessels, 1997).
Negotiations within European policy net-
works contain elements of both conflict and
mutual dependence. Members of the policy
networks expect mutuality in their exchanges
of advantages and benefits between the mem-
bers of the networks (Wilks andWright, 1987).
These exchanges consist mainly of exchanges
of expert knowledge and inside information
from within the core of the network. The
expectation of mutuality encourages members
of the community to take a long-term strategic
view. Thismeans that actionsmust bemutually
adjusted and that short-termbenefits oftenhave
to be foregone in order to maintain recurrent
interactions.
Informal relations among the members are
also a precondition for achieving trust and
informality. This is a necessity for the well-
functioning of a policy network andwithout it a
deliberate and free exchange of ideas and
discussions of future policy options cannot
take place. Although often highly formalized,
that is, EU decision-making to a large
extent depends on informal communications
(Wallace, 1997). This has implications for
private lobbying efforts and for the formation
of corporate political strategies. The informal
character of the decentralized policy networks
enhances the dynamic interactions between
the actors within the network.
This suggests that several strategies can be—
and often are—deployed simultaneously. To
act collectively as well as individually does not
have to be incompatible. The samepoint can be
made concerning the fact that a firm can send
different experts in different forums of exper-
tise. Forums in which the firm has a direct
interest can be distinguished from forums in
which the firms have an indirect interest.
Forums can have a close, insular, highly
technical nature and are characterized by a
long time span or they can be more open in
character such as issue networks or ad hoc
coalitions. Participation of different types of
forums can reinforce the position of the firm in
the European arena.
Firms that try to influence EU policy-making,
therefore, need to develop a resource base in
which knowledge development and relational
skills are particularly important (Dahan, 2005).
Also, firms need to develop the ability to
recognize potential points of entrywhen trying
to bring their interests to bear on European
decision-making (Saurugger, 2001). Next to
substantial knowledge and expertise, there-
fore, the ability to recognize useful entry points
and the appropriate timing of lobbying
attempts are critically important when firms
try to realize influence on EU decision-making.
This means that handling public affairs through
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EU lobbying puts particular pressure on corpo-
rate strategies (Figure 3). Firms need to be able
to recognize what their political interests are
(Martin, 2002). They also need to combine this
with market considerations and must learn to
adjust their lobbying efforts to a very compli-
cated policy process.
This requires strategic intent and vision as
well as actively monitoring the lobbying
activities of rivals. For instance, a firm can opt
for participation in an expert forum that may
relate most closely to its core business. An
empirical example are oil companies that can
provide expertise on cleaner fuels in an expert
group but which can also provide expertise in,
say, an expert group on fiscal measures
(Taminiau, 2001). Information from different
forums can be combined.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of corporate lobbying in
Europe critically depends on the quality of
firms’ knowledge and information strategies.
Financial incentive strategies are not applicable
in an EU context. Forms of constituency
building can be effective given the consistent
search of the EU institutions to legitimate their
decision-making through citizen and stake-
holder dialogue. New ICT technologies greatly
facilitate this. At the same time, in direct
interaction with the committees and decision-
making bodies of the European Union, provid-
ing reliable information to public officials
remains the single most important way to
achieve influence. For politically active firms
this means that being able to provide informa-
tion, both to other interested parties as well as
to the EU institutions, becomes strategically
important. Handling pubic affairs through
lobbying, therefore, first of all requires firms
to manage their knowledge and information
strategies in an effective way.
By implication, this increases the strategic
importance of firms’ information processing
capabilities, while at the same time increasing
the likelihood of firm-internal conflicts of
interests. Increasing the effectiveness of lobby-
ing attempts hence can be realized by monitor-
ing informationprocessingwithin the firm. The
effectiveness of lobbying attempts increasingly















Figure 3. Pressures on firms’ lobbying strategies in an EU context.
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information flows and to exchange knowledge
internally within its own organization and
externally with other interested parties. That
is, the importance of knowledgeflowsbetween
interested parties in many ways increases
relative to knowledge flows towards the EU
institutions. Corporate lobbying in Europe,
therefore, greatly dependsonfirms’ knowledge
and information management capabilities.
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